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I. INTRODUCTION
URING the Survey period, a significant number of environmen-
tal cases were decided by courts in Texas,' including a seminal
case in the context of nuisance law, one of the first cases in which
a court ruled on the application of the privilege under the Texas Environ-
1. The federal and state cases are too numerous to discuss in the survey article. We
have tried to discuss the decisions of the Texas state courts primarily, and those that we felt
were more significant or more interesting.
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mental, Health, and Safety Audit Privilege Act, 2 and a case in which cer-
tain landowners attempted to use the citizens suit provision of the federal
Pipeline Safety Act 3 to address alleged significant risks from a pipeline by
asking a court in essence to take over operation of the pipeline. As in
past years, the cases provide interesting facts and important legal
arguments.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS AND COST
RECOVERY CLAIMS
The Texas Supreme Court handed down a landmark opinion in the
area of environmental torts. The Schneider decision set a new standard
for distinguishing a temporary and permanent nuisance, which deter-
mines the measure of damages and often whether a case is barred by the
statute of limitations.4 The supreme court also addressed a number of
other issues encountered in environmental tort and cost recovery cases
that could provide seminal statements for future development in environ-
mental suits. 5
A. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
1. Texas Supreme Court Establishes a New Standard for Determining
Whether a Claim Is for a Temporary or Permanent
Nuisance.
One of the most important cases decided during the Survey period is
Schneider National Carriers, Inc v. Bates.6 This case will likely be consid-
ered a landmark case for environmental torts, because it sets a new stan-
dard to address one of the critical issues in environmental contamination
cases: whether injury to property is permanent or temporary. Prior Texas
case law, developed over more than a century, left much room for inter-
pretation and application of the rule and standards, resulting in decisions
applying the same law under similar facts with different results. Conflict-
ing applications of the law made the job of attorneys for plaintiffs and
defendants much more confusing and the proper analysis by courts much
more challenging.
The ultimate holding of the Texas Supreme Court in the Schneider case
was that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. 7 The application of the statute of limitations is generally one
of the most important results of the determination of whether a nuisance
or other environmental tort claim for damage to property involves a per-
manent or temporary injury to land. Several other cases addressed the
statute of limitations during the Survey period, but this case should be
2. TEX. REV. CIv. STATS. ANN. art. 4447cc, §§ 1-13 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
3. 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101-60133 (2000).
4. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004).
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 268.
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considered most carefully by practitioners. 8
The Schneider case, like many other environmental tort cases, hinged
initially on the question of whether the plaintiffs' claims were barred by
the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs claimed that various defendants
were causing a nuisance with respect to the plaintiffs' homes or property
through their industrial operations along the Houston ship channel. The
plaintiffs also asserted claims of trespass, negligence, negligence per se,
negligent endangerment, and gross negligence-all of which were subject
to the two-year statute of limitations. 9 The critical issue in these cases
often is when a cause of action accrues. In Texas, the cause of action for a
permanent injury to property accrues and the statute of limitations begins
to run when the injury occurs, or if the discovery rule applies, when the
plaintiff knew or should have known through reasonable inquiry that the
injury existed. 10 For temporary damages, a cause of action can be
brought for injury or damages occurring two years prior to filing suit."1
As a result of this rule, it is clear why a plaintiff who has been injured or
discovered his injury more than two years before suit was filed would
argue that the damages or injury are temporary-to avoid his claims be-
ing barred by the statute of limitations.
The plaintiffs' claims in the Schneider case were similar to those in
many air emissions tort cases. The plaintiffs alleged that they could not
go outside, had to keep their doors and windows shut because of foul
odors, and that airborne material was deposited on their homes, yards,
cars, and other property.12 The plaintiffs filed affidavits with the trial
court as part of the requirements of a "Lone Pine Order," which requires
plaintiffs in such cases to provide basic facts regarding their claims. In
these affidavits, the plaintiffs admitted that conditions had been going on
for a long time, definitely more than two years. 13 An interesting aspect of
these cases is that because the wind changes direction, the plaintiffs often
agree or assert that the smell or deposition of material is not constant
every day, but changes as the direction and speed of the wind changes.
The question of whether this sort of injury is permanent or temporary is
thus one that has challenged the courts.
As a result of the difficulty of applying the Texas rule in these and
other difficult factual scenarios, the Texas Supreme Court believed that
the Texas rule had not been clear enough to allow courts to reach consis-
tent opinions. 14 The majority decided to develop a new standard for de-
8. See K-7 Enters., L.P. v. Jeswood Oil Co., No. 2-03-312-CV, 2004 WL 1219062 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth June 3, 2004) (opinion withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by 2005
WL 182947 (Jan 27, 2005)); Potter v. Kaufman & Broad Home Sys. of Tex., Inc., 137
S.W.3d 701 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. h.); Walton v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 08-
02-00485-CV, 2004 WL 440874 (Tex. App.-El Paso Mar. 11, 2004, no pet. h.).
9. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 268, 270.
10. Id. at 279.
11. Id. at 280.
12. Id. at 268-69.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 274.
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termining when an injury is permanent or temporary. 15
Under the Texas rule, a nuisance was permanent if it was "'an activity
of such a character and existing under such circumstances that it will be
presumed to continue indefinitely.' Thus, a nuisance is permanent if it is
'constant and continuous,' and if 'injury constantly and regularly re-
curs."' 1 6 On the other hand, a temporary nuisance was one that was "of
limited duration ... uncertain if any future injury will occur, or if future
injury 'is liable to occur only at long intervals'.. . 'occasional, intermittent
or recurrent,' or 'sporadic and contingent upon some irregular force such
as rain.'1 1
7
The court decided to adhere to the American rule on the distinction
between temporary and permanent nuisances and the Texas rule on how
to make the distinction. 18 However, as a result of the difficulty in apply-
ing the Texas rule, the court decided to develop a new standard for deter-
mining the "boundary lines" in the continuum between a temporary and
a permanent nuisance. 19 The problem in drawing the distinction along
this continuum is demonstrated by two cases that were decided by the
Texas Supreme Court at different times involving flooding. In one case,
the court decided flooding created a temporary nuisance and, in another
case, a permanent nuisance. 20 Similarly, in two other cases involving
dust, smoke and cinders, the court reached opposite results, in one case
ruling that dust, smoke and cinders from a power plant caused a tempo-
rary nuisance but in another case ruling that when dust, smoke, and cin-
der arose from a locomotive, a permanent nuisance resulted.
21
In order to attempt to clarify the standards that should be applied in
determining whether a nuisance is temporary or permanent, the court fo-
cused first and foremost on the legal consequences that flow from which
15. Id. at 276.
16. Id. at 272 (internal citations omitted); see also Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223,
227 (Tex. 1978); Columbian Carbon Co. v. Tholen, 199 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1947, writ ref'd) (affirming jury's finding of permanent nuisance based on in-
struction, "[b]y the term 'permanent' as used in the foregoing charge is meant a condition
of such a character and which exists under such circumstances that it will be presumed to
continue indefinitely.").
17. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 272 (internal citations omitted).
18. Id. at 273.
19. Id.; see also Nugent v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 30 S.W.3d 562, 569, 571 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2000, pet. denied) (holding chicken hatchery waste dumped on neighboring hill-
side was temporary as defendants "did not build a facility"); Lamb v. Kinslow, 256 S.W.2d
903, 904-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding nuisance involving an-
nual burning of cotton burns near plaintiff's home was permanent, as "he is deprived of the
enjoyment of his home for several months of the year").
20. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 273-74 (citing Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223, 227
(Tex. 1978) (holding to be a temporary nuisance); City of Amarillo v. Ware, 40 S.W.2d 57,
61-62 (Tex. 1931) (flooking to be a permanent nuisance)); see also Durden v. City of Grand
Prairie, 626 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (saying flood-
ing caused by a storm sewer in north Texas was permanent as a matter of law).
21. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 274 (citing Parsons v. Uvalde Elec. Light Co., 163 S.W. 1,
1-2 (Tex. 1914); Rosenthal v. Taylor, B. & H. Ry. Co., 79 Tex. 325, 15 S.W. 268, 269 (Tex.
1891)); see also Angelina Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Irwin, 276 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1955) (holding sawdust and soot from sawmill was permanent nuisance).
20051
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distinction is made: "1) whether damages are available for future or only
past injuries; (2) whether one or a series of suits is required; and (3)
whether claims accrue (and thus limitations begins) with the first or each
subsequent injury [expected in the future]. '22
a. Damages for Future or Only Past Injuries
The first consequence of the distinction is what damages may be recov-
ered: for temporary nuisance, recovery is for lost use and enjoyment mea-
sured by the lost-rental value, and for permanent nuisance, recovery is for
lost-market value, which includes lost-rental value.23 The crux of the
Texas Supreme Court's consideration of these issues in determining the
proper classification for a nuisance is whether the impact of the nuisance
is likely to be one that has caused a temporary loss but not a permanent
reduction in market value.24 In particular, the court discussed an injury
that occurs infrequently, but over a period of years, occurs often enough
to cause a loss in the market value of the property. 25 According to the
court, a nuisance need not continue daily; it could occur annually and still
result in a reduction in the market value of the property.2 6 In applying
this concept, the court would require that the lower courts consider
whether the "injury occurs often enough before trial that jurors can make
a reasonable estimate of the long-term impact of the nuisance on the
market value of a property"; if so, the court concluded that the lower
courts should allow the jury to make that determination. 27
b. Claims Splitting
The second legal consequence the court considered was the splitting of
claims for purposes of bringing sequential lawsuits for temporary inju-
ries.28 If the rule is that suit may be brought for injuries occurring two
years before filing suit, then multiple suits would follow, absent an injunc-
tion to force the defendant or defendants to cease their activities causing
the injury. 29 In Texas, claim splitting into multiple lawsuits is generally
prohibited. 30 Under the standard developed by the court in this case,
where a temporary injury exists, claim splitting is perceived as a necessary
evil because future damages cannot be accurately calculated.31 The
court, however, viewed multiple lawsuits filed once a decade to be accept-
able, but not several times a year, the goal being to limit the number of
22. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 275 n.49.
23. Id. at 276.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 276-77.
26. Id. However, the court did point out that a decrease or increase in market value
alone does not determine whether a nuisance exists, as other factors affect market value
over time. Id. at 277.
27. Id.






lawsuits through the determination of whether an injury is permanent or
temporary. 32 Again, the court's stated goal was to allow the jury to deter-
mine the future damages if it can do so in one lawsuit as opposed to
several.3 3
c. Accrual of Cause of Action for Limitations Purposes
The third concept that the court applied to the distinction between
temporary and permanent nuisances focuses on when a cause of action
accrues for purposes of the application of the statute of limitations and
thus when a party's cause of action is barred. 34 The first issue discussed
was the typical accrual date, when an injury first occurs.35 The discovery
rule offers an exception whereby the accrual date is "when an injury is
both inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifiable. '36 With a nui-
sance claim, the court observed that, since the nature of the cause of ac-
tion is the loss of enjoyment, "plaintiffs will usually know of unreasonable
discomfort or annoyance promptly.... [Thus,] application of the discov-
ery rule in nuisance cases is rare.'
37
In explaining the application of the accrual issue for nuisance cases, the
court pointed out that a claim accrues upon the claimant's notice of in-
jury, even if the claimant does not yet know the full extent of damages or
the chances of avoiding them.38 Thus, if a party is aware a portion of its
property is harmed, then he may have to investigate the remainder of his
property to determine the full extent of the injury or risk losing his claims
for undiscovered damage. 39
The court distinguished the case in which additional harm is done to
property by reviewing the example of the Atlas Chemical case.40 In that
case, pollutants of various kinds had been discharged into a creek up-
stream of the plaintiff's land for more than forty years. A subsequent
discharge, however, of new pollutants affected sixty acres owned by the
plaintiff that had not been previously polluted-the new pollution occur-
ring as a result of extraordinary floods.41 In that case, the court decided
that a new and distinct injury occurred and that the new injury would not
be barred but would be subject to a new running of limitations. 42 "An
old nuisance does not excuse a new and different one."
43
The court appeared to be interested in establishing a new rule or stan-
32. Id. at 278-79.
33. Id.






40. Id. (discussing Atlas Chem. Indus. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975)).
41. Atlas Chem., 527 S.W.2d at 685-87.
42. Id.
43. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 280.
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dard that would make most cases a permanent nuisance.44 The court
stated that "once the conditions begin to recur more often, the nuisance
should normally be treated as permanent because it is injury to the prop-
erty in general that has occurred, not separate injuries that ought to be
considered separately. '45
The standard of distinguishing permanent from temporary nuisances
elucidated by the court is generally based on the jury's ability to deter-
mine damages. If the event leading to the injury happens with such fre-
quency that the jury would likely have sufficient evidence to determine
the impact on the value of the plaintiff's property value, then the nui-
sance would be permanent. If the impact on the property would be spec-
ulative, then the nuisance would be deemed temporary. 46
d. Consideration of the Permanence of the Source of the Nuisance
or the Injury Caused by the Nuisance
The court next turned to the question whether the source of the nui-
sance or the injury itself should be considered in determining the perma-
nence of the nuisance. 47 The court noted that Texas courts had
considered both.48 The court's conclusion on this issue would appear to
allow a temporary nuisance in only rare circumstances: "The presump-
tion of a connection between the two can be rebutted by evidence that a
defendant's noxious operations cause injury only under circumstances so
rare that, even when they occur, it remains uncertain whether or to what
degree they may ever occur again."' 49 Thus, an operation that emits air
pollutants would not be considered temporary just because the wind
changes direction from day to day.
e. Ability to Abate the Nuisance
The ability to abate a nuisance has been a central focus in some states,
but not in Texas. 50 While recognized as a relevant issue in some cases,
precisely how the ability to enjoin the nuisance would affect the categori-
zation of the nuisance was not clear. 51 The court decided that the ability
to abate the nuisance should not be considered in distinguishing the type
of nuisance.52
The court viewed the issuance of an injunction as an end to a perma-




47. Id. at 282.
48. Id. (citing Baugh v. Tex. & N.O. Ry. Co., 15 S.W. 587, 588 (Tex. 1891)); see also
Meat Producers, Inc. v. McFarland, 476 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
49. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 283.
50. Id.




tion are "mutually exclusive."'53 The court identified the problem of
double recovery if damages and an injunction are both issued.54 The
court ruled that if an injunction is issued, the nuisance is no longer per-
manent, but if an injunction is not issued, it may still be permanent or
temporary.55 In an apparent contrary conclusion, the court ruled that
abatement of the source would not eliminate the injury, so the nuisance
would still be considered permanent. 56 The court was concerned that the
plaintiff would still suffer lost market value of his property even with the
abatement of the source. 57 An example might be a pollution source that
was abated, but the plaintiff's property remains polluted.
The court then turned to the issue whether certain activities or opera-
tions should be abated.58 Because judges, acting as courts of equity, de-
termine whether an injunction should be granted, the Texas Supreme
Court stated that the equities may require that public works remain oper-
ational, or even private plants may be allowed to emit noxious odors,
based on factors such as location and how "badly they are needed.
59
The broader economic and environmental impact would be considered in
determining whether to shut down a plant.60 Environmental regulation
was seen as a better means to decide how a plant's operations should be
altered.61
The court was clear that an injunction or the effect of an injunction
does not revive claims for a permanent nuisance that were not filed
before the running of the statute of limitations. 62 The court did not ad-
dress the issue whether an injunction may be sought where the claim for
damages would be barred but noted several cases in which an injunction
action was allowed beyond the limitations period for seeking damages.
63
The court considered the question of issuing an injunction to fall on the
balancing of the equities, particularly where private parties were con-
cerned.64 While noting that governments have the right of eminent do-
main to take private property, the court stated that, because private
parties do not have this right, allowing the nuisance to continue if the
operator of the source will pay damages to those suffering the uninvited
53. Id. at 284.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 285.
56. Id. at 286.
57. Id. at 285-86.
58. Id. at 286.
59. Id. at 287.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 288-89.
63. See id. (citing Nugent v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 30 S.W.3d 562, 575 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2000, pet. denied) (holding equitable relief not barred by limitations); Abbott v.
City of Princeton, 721 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same);
Stein v. Highland Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 540 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1976, writ refused n.r.e.) (same)).
64. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 289.
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nuisance is often not an equitable result.65
f. Application of the Legal Analysis to the Case
In reviewing the particular case before it, the court ruled that the air
emissions and noise issues suffered by the plaintiffs were permanent nui-
sances.66 The affidavits of the plaintiffs stated that the nuisances had con-
tinued for many years and, based upon those affidavits, would continue in
the years to come several times each week or month.67 The court noted
that a sudden industrial accident or other irregular occurrence could cre-
ate a nuisance that is properly deemed temporary, despite the long- term
regular operations of the neighboring plants.68 No allegations of such
events were made.69
g. Ability to Bring a Trespass Suit for Light, Noise, and Air
Pollution
The court raised some doubt as to whether a trespass claim, as opposed
to a nuisance claim, may be brought for light, noise, and air pollution that
affects neighboring properties.70 The court indicated that it doubts such
claims may be made and cited two decisions in this regard.71 The issue is
whether some thing must physically invade the property of another in
order to result in a trespass. 72 This case, thus, raises a legal question as to
the ability to bring trespass cases in nuisance cases involving light, noise,
and even deposition of particles.
h. Impact of Schneider
The impact of the Schneider case may be more certainty for litigants
and lower courts in determining what is a temporary or permanent nui-
sance and when an injury is permanent or temporary for purposes of tres-
pass or negligence claims. 73 It is likely that more cases will be deemed
permanent and fewer temporary. As a result, more cases may be barred
by the statute of limitations because many plaintiffs do not attempt to
engage counsel and file suit until many years after a purported nuisance
or trespass occurs.
The potential for seeking an injunction when the ability to seek dam-
ages is barred by limitations is another significant issue raised, though not
decided by the court. 74 This would, in essence, have the effect of resusci-
65. Id. at 289-90.
66. Id. at 290.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 292.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 567 (Tex. 1962) ("To
constitute trespass there must be some physical entry upon the land by some 'thing."');
Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tex. 1961)).
72. Id.
73. See generally Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 264.
74. Id. at 288-89.
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tating a claim as a defendant may settle with a plaintiff by payment of
money if the defendant's operations are faced with potential shutdown.
The court did indicate a balancing of economic, environmental and other
public issues in determining whether such a shutdown would be possi-
ble. 75 It also indicated that the regulation of air emissions and related
issues may be best left to regulatory agencies.
76
2. CERCLA Provision on Statutes of Limitations Accrual Date for
Personal Injury and Property Damages Claims Arising from
Hazardous Substances, Pollutants, or Contaminants
After reviewing the Texas Supreme Court's treatise on accrual dates
for property-damage claims, it is interesting to consider a federal statu-
tory provision on state-law accrual dates for claims involving hazardous
substances, pollutants, and contaminants. The issue arose in a case filed
in federal court over the accrual date for a Texas statute of repose arising
from a claim related to a release of chemicals from a tank.77 One of the
defendants sued the installer of the tank. The defendant asserted that
Section 16.012 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compen-
sation and Liability Act,78 required that the cause of action had not ac-
crued until he was aware of the claim and aware that it was caused by a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant. 79 The federal district
court faced with this issue ruled that such a federal-discovery rule does
not apply unless a CERCLA cause of action was also asserted by the
plaintiff, in this case a third-party plaintiff.80 The Fourth Circuit and two
district courts have similarly held.8 1 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
has ruled that no CERCLA claim must be filed and that all state personal
injury and property damages claims were nevertheless subject to the fed-
eral discovery rule with respect to state statutes of limitations.
82
The district court adopted the Fourth Circuit's holding and ruled that
the defendant's claim was barred by the statute of repose.8 3 The district
court also held that the discovery rule applied to the commencement of
the cause of action but not to the length of the limitations period; accord-
ingly, it would not have allowed any additional time to file the claim.
84
Finally, the court, in rejecting an intermediate California court's holding,
ruled that CERCLA would not apply because the third-party defendant
75. Id. at 286-87.
76. See id. at 287.
77. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chem Co., Inc., No. 5-04-CV-047-C,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17215, at *4, *11, *34-35 (N. D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2004).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a) (2000).
79. Burlington N., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17215, at *4, *34-37 (citing Freir v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 196 (2d Cir. 2002)).
80. Id. at *34-35.
81. Id. at *35 n.8 (citations omitted).
82. Id. (citations omitted).




was not a "responsible person" under CERCLA.8 5
B. STANDING IN SUITS FOR PAST INJURY TO PROPERTY
In Denman v. CEC Pipeline Co., 86 the court considered whether subse-
quent purchasers have standing to bring suit for injuries to property that
occurred before their purchase of the property. In this case, the landown-
ers, the Denmans, filed suit against several defendants, including CEC,
for alleged contamination and injuries to their land caused by the pres-
ence of oil and gas equipment. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to the defendants on the ground that the Denmans, as subsequent
purchasers of the property, lacked standing to sue for injuries that oc-
curred before their purchase of the property.87
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment.88 The appellate court held that the right to sue for the injury to
land is a personal right belonging to the person owning the property at
the time of the injury.89 The court held that the Denmans did not have
standing to bring suit against the oil company because any injury to their
property occurred before they purchased it, and their deed contained no
assignment of any cause of action.90 Whether the injuries are character-
ized as permanent or temporary is not important to the inquiry on
standing.91
C. "As Is" PROVISION AS A DEFENSE TO TORT OR COST
RECOVERY CLAIMS
Environmental and other attorneys routinely draft real estate purchase
and sale agreements and other contracts with "as is" or "where is, as is"
provisions. Two cases during the Survey period raise questions at to the
effectiveness. of these provisions to prevent future environmental and
health claims.
1. "As Is" Provision Does Not Bar Claims under the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act
The question of the effect of "as is" provisions in real estate purchase
and sale agreements on environmental statutory claims is one that has
raised numerous views among practitioners. In Bonnie Blue, Inc. v.
Reichenstein, the Dallas Court of Appeals ruled that, even though the
seller and buyer of real estate had agreed in their contract of sale that the
property was being sold "as is," the buyer could bring a later claim under
the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA") for costs of remediating
85. Id. at *39-40.
86. 123 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet. h.).
87. Id. at 730.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 732.
90. Id. at 734.
91. Id. at 732, 734-35.
[Vol. 58
Environmental Law
the property for contamination existing at the time of the sale. 92
The court reviewed the holdings in what has been considered the lead-
ing case on the effect of "as is" provisions. 93 In Prudential Insurance Co.
v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd., the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the
plaintiff could not recover for asbestos present in the building sold by the
defendant as a result of an alleged misrepresentation of the condition of
the building because the "as is" provision in the Prudential case pre-
vented the buyer from proving that the seller caused the buyer harm.94
The Dallas Court of Appeals ruled that a cause of action under SWDA is
different in that the claim is not a damages claim based on misrepresenta-
tion or failure to disclose but a statutory claim for cleanup costs, in which
the causation issues in Prudential are not present. 95 The court concluded
that a "responsible party" under the statute will be held liable "without
the need to establish causation."'96 While this may be true to establish
liability, causation may be an element of apportionment of liability.97
2. "As Is" Provisions and Leases
Caldwell v. Curioni 98 involved claims by lessees of residential property
for injuries caused by mold. The Caldwells brought suit against lessor
Curioni for damages for personal injuries and property damage allegedly
caused by mold in the house they rented from Curioni. The Dallas Court
of Appeals did not allow the lessor to rely upon the "as is" provision in
the lease and reversed the summary judgment finding in his favor.99
The court did not allow the "as is" clause in the lease to bar the
Caldwells' causes of action against Curioni. 1°° The court found that the
Caldwells took the property "as is," except for conditions materially af-
fecting the safety or health of ordinary persons.1° 1 In reversing the grant
of Curioni's "no evidence" summary-judgment motion, the court found
that the Caldwells offered more than a scintilla of evidence that Curioni
breached a duty to them and thereby caused their damages. 10 2 The
Caldwells
offered evidence: (1) that Curioni had reason to know... that there
was an infestation of mold in the house, (2) that there were poten-
tially harmful effects of mold, (3) that he should have cured the mold
problem before renting the house to the Caldwells, and (4) that his
failure to eliminate the mold before the Caldwells occupied the
92. Bonnie Blue, Inc. v. Reichenstein, 127 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no
pet. h.).
93. Id. at 368.
94. 896 S.W.2d 156, 159, 161 (Tex. 1995).
95. Bonnie Blue, 127 S.W.3d at 370.
96. Id. at 369.
97. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.343(a)(1) (Vernon 2001).
98. 125 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
99. Id. at 788, 792.
100. Id. at 792.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 794.
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house caused their physical injuries and property damage. 10 3
The court noted that:
there are several exceptions to the general rule . . . [that] a lessor
generally has no duty to tenants or their invitees for dangerous con-
ditions on the leased premises... [For example,] a lessor who makes
repairs may be liable for injuries resulting from the lessor's negli-
gence in making the repairs. In addition, a lessor who conceals de-
fects on the leased premises of which [he] is aware may also be
liable. The lessor need not have actual knowledge of a dangerous
condition. It is enough that he has reason to know that the condition
exists . . . that is, that he has information from which a person of
reasonable intelligence ... would infer that the condition exists...
and in addition would realize that its existence will involve an unrea-
sonable risk of physical harm to persons on the land.
10 4
The Caldwells presented summary judgment evidence that Curioni
"had reason to know, and should have known, of the infestation of mold
and its potentially harmful effects.' 01 ° 5 They offered the opinion of a con-
struction expert that there was
widespread mold growth throughout the house which had probably
resulted from flooding caused by a ruptured water heater before the
Caldwells had moved [into the house].... The expert noted that the
carpet tackboards had been freshly painted, which he interpreted as
an attempt to cover up a serious problem. 10 6
Furthermore, the lessor advertised the property as "freshly redone"
which the expert observed indicated an attempt to deceive. The
Caldwells also offered evidence that Curioni should have known of the
mold problem and made inadequate preparations for renting the house
for occupancy. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that "Cu-
rioni failed to conclusively negate he owed a duty to the Caldwells.'
10 7
D. UNACCEPTED OFFER BY DEFENDANT TO PURCHASE LAND Is NOT
EVIDENCE OF MARKET VALUE
The means to determine market value and what the court or an ap-
praiser may consider in environmental cases in which property damages
are sought is an important and often tricky issue for many reasons. In
some cases, prior offers to purchase property are raised by parties to the
litigation, and the issue of their admissibility and use by experts may be-
come an issue. In Mieth v. Ranchguest, Inc.,10s the offer made by the
defendant stated that it was not an offer of settlement. Therefore, the
court ruled that it was not barred by Rule 408 of the Texas Rules of Evi-
103. Id.
104. Id. at 790.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 790-91.
107. Id. at 791.
108. Mieth v. Ranchguest, Inc., No. 01-02-00461-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 4601, at
*13-14 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 20, 2004, no pet. h.).
[Vol. 58
Environmental Law
dence regarding offers of settlement. 10 9 The offer to purchase by the de-
fendant matched the fair market value of the property before the injury
that the plaintiffs' appraiser stated in his testimony. The defendants ar-
gued to the jury that the offer to purchase by the defendant proved there
was no diminution in value to the property as a result of contamination of
only a portion of the plaintiffs' property. The court stated that an unac-
cepted offer to purchase is not reliable evidence of market value, and the
jury had no basis to conclude there was not diminution in value of the
property.110
E. TEXAS ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY AUDIT
PRIVILEGE ACT
In one of the first cases to consider the privilege under Texas Environ-
mental, Health, and Safety Audit Privilege Act,"' the Houston Four-
teenth Court of Appeals in Waste Management of Texas, Inc. v.
Blackwel1 12 decided that the more traditional audit reports were prop-
erly protected, but daily note-taking on company activities did not con-
stitute an "audit" under the Act.113 Mandamus was denied by the
appeals court and production of the notes and testimony of employees
would have to go forward. 11 4
In that case, the plaintiffs sued Waste Management for state law causes
of action alleging that the expansion of Waste Management's recycling
and disposal facility interfered with the use and enjoyment of Blackwell's
property. In connection with the suit, Blackwell sought to discover audits
of the facility and the testimony of one of Waste Management's employ-
ees about events of noncompliance at the facility.11 5
The trial court ordered that audits conducted under the facility's Envi-
ronmental Compliance Program and audits to complete the Environmen-
tal Compliance Representation were privileged under the Texas
Environmental, Health, and Safety Audit Privilege Act ("Audit Privilege
Act" or "Act"). 116 On the other hand, the trial court held that neither
the audit conducted to evaluate compliance with the provision of the
state air emissions regulations that prohibit a regulated party from caus-
ing a nuisance nor the employee's testimony about acts of noncompliance
with this provision fell under the statutory privilege provided by the
Act. 117 To attempt to preserve its assertion of the Act's privilege, Waste
Management filed an interlocutory appeal and a petition for writ of
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Lee v. Lee, 47 S.W.3d 767, 785 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001,
pet. denied).
111. TEX. REV. Civ. STATS. ANN. art. 4447cc, §§ 1-13 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005),
112. 130 S.W.3d 337, 341-43 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
113. See id.
114. Id. at 343.
115. Id. at 338-39.
116. Id. at 339; see also 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.4 (2001) (Tex. Comm'n on Envtl.
Quality).




The appellate court first determined whether it had jurisdiction to hear
the interlocutory appeal. 119 The court held that it had jurisdiction to hear
an interlocutory appeal under the Audit Privilege Act only when the au-
dit disclosure is ordered for one of the reasons enumerated in Section 7 of
the Act.' 20 Under Section 7, a court may order disclosure of an audit
report if it determines: (1) the privilege is asserted for an improper use,
(2) the portion of the audit report is not subject to the privilege under
Section 8 of the Act, or (3) the portion of the audit report shows evidence
of noncompliance with an environmental or health and safety law and
appropriate efforts to achieve compliance with the law were not promptly
initiated and pursued.'21 The court held that it did not have jurisdiction
to consider the interlocutory appeal because the trial court did not deter-
mine that the alleged audit to evaluate compliance with the nuisance reg-
ulation were required to be disclosed by Section 7 of the Act.1 22
With regard to the mandamus petition, the appellate court stated that if
the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the production of the priv-
ileged information, then mandamus relief would be appropriate. 123 The
party claiming the privilege bears the burden of producing proof to sup-
port its contention that the documents in question qualify for the privi-
lege. The court held that Waste Management's affidavits did not
sufficiently raise and prove the privilege under the Act.124 Waste Man-
agement's counsel agreed that the audits consisted solely of field notes
and records of observations. The court held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the audits did not qualify as privi-
leged audits or in ordering the limited testimony of Waste Management's
employee. 125 Thus, the court denied the request for mandamus. 126
F. RELATIONSHIP OF CERCLA CONSENT DECREE AND EVIDENCE
OF CAUSATION
In Martin v. Commercial Metals Co.,1 2 7 the plaintiff sued a number of
companies that sold raw materials to a lead smelter alleging personal in-
jury caused by exposure to toxic substances. The companies were parties
to a CERCLA consent decree assigning clean-up responsibility for the
smelter site. Each defendant moved for summary judgment on the
ground that it did not cause plaintiff's injuries. The trial court granted





122. Id. at 341-42.
123. Id. at 342-43.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 343.
127. 138 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
128. Id. at 621-23.
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the plaintiff, to prevail on his personal injury claim, must show that the
conduct of a defendant caused an event that caused the plaintiff to suffer
compensable injuries. 129 The court concluded that the mere selling of
raw materials did no more than "furnish a condition which made the in-
jury possible," and that is insufficient, by itself, to establish cause in
fact.130 To avoid summary judgment the plaintiff was required to offer
evidence "that there was a causal link between ... selling scrap metal to
the smelter's operators and the release ... of toxic byproducts into the
environment. '131
In his summary judgment response, the plaintiff relied on the CER-
CLA consent decree as evidence of causation. 132 The court concluded
that this reliance was misplaced: CERCLA "is directed toward the
unique ends of cleaning up hazardous sites and apportioning costs for the
clean-up. Its standards are very different from the standard of common
law negligence in Texas. '133 The court thus found that the CERCLA
consent decree was not evidence that the defendants were the cause of
the plaintiff's injuries. 134 Accordingly, the court declined to overturn the
trial court's rulings. 135
G. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND CAUSATION
Causation was the main challenge in two other cases claiming personal
injury. 136 The appellate court reviewed the appeal of the lower court's
decision on the use of expert testimony to establish causation. In the first
case, the court upheld the jury finding that a party was liable for the per-
sonal injury to a resident caused by the release of benzene from a landfill
and migration through the ground to the plaintiff's home.137 Test wells
showed that benzene was present near the home. Even though there was
never any measurement of the levels of benzene in the home, inferences
were allowed as to the expert's calculation of those concentrations and
that those concentrations were capable of causing acute lymphocytic
leukemia.138
In the second case, the court ruled that the plaintiff must show that the
chemicals she was exposed to in her workplace originated from the defen-
dant's operations and caused her illness.1 39 The plaintiff's experts testi-
129. Id. at 625.




134. Id. at 626-27.
135. Id. at 627.
136. See City of San Antonio v. Pollock, No. 04-03-00403-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS
7391, at *15-17 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Aug. 18, 2004, pet. filed); Feria v. Dynagraphics
Co., Inc., No. 08-00-00078-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 2366, at *2-3, *15-16 (Tex. App.-El
Paso Mar. 15, 2004, pet. denied).
137. Pollock, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 7391, at *5.
138. Id. at *15-17.
139. Feria, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 2366, at *2-3, *15-16.
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fied that the exposure to solvents from a print shop caused the illness but
did not specifically testify that no other source of chemicals in the build-
ing did not cause the disease and did not establish a nexus between the
illness and the defendant's conduct at the print shop. The court appeared
to conclude that even if the testimony would have passed a Daubert test
on the issue of the chemicals causing the illness, there was no testimony
to prove that the chemicals the plaintiff was allegedly exposed to
originated from the defendant's print shop. 140
III. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY FOR ALLEGED
FAILURE TO PROPERLY DISCLOSE CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES
In a case that may have important implications for directors and of-
ficers of publicly traded companies, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that an insurance policy designed to protect directors and officers
from claims by shareholders would not protect such parties' alleged fail-
ure to disclose environmental liabilities in filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and in press releases because the policy excluded
environmental claims. 141
In the underlying lawsuits, the plaintiff shareholders alleged the com-
pany on whose board the defendants served had acquired other waste
management businesses without regard to their environmental liabilities
and without disclosing the environmental practices or liabilities of these
companies to shareholders. An FBI investigation of the operations of
one of the acquired companies alleged the knowing discharge of hazard-
ous wastes into a city sewage system and the knowing illegal transport
and disposal of hazardous waste. This investigation led to an expensive
cleanup and the closure of one of the acquired company's waste manage-
ment facilities. The shareholder plaintiffs alleged the directors and of-
ficers actively concealed the illegal activities of the acquired company
from the shareholders and the public. When this information became
known to the public, the price per share of the company fell $10.75. Trad-
ing of the company's stock was halted for six days, and analysts down-
graded the stock's rating.1 42
The court concluded that the pollution exclusion in the director and
officer policy applied to any loss in connection with a claim "alleging,
arising out of, based upon, attributable to, or in any way involving, di-
rectly or indirectly" pollution matters. 143 The exclusion specifically stated
"including but not limited to a Claim alleging damage to the Company or
its securities holders. 1 144 The holding was bolstered by the rule in Texas
140. Id. at *15-16.
141. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. U.S. Liquids, Inc., No. 03-20542, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2694, at *1-3 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2004).
142. Id. at *3-5.
143. Id. at *2-3, *16-17.
144. Id. at *3.
[Vol. 58
Environmental Law
that an insurance exclusion "need only bear an incidental relationship to
the described conduct for the exclusion to apply. '145 The court applied a
"but for" test and concluded that "but for" the underlying illegal activi-
ties related to pollution, there would be no shareholder claims against the
officers and directors. 146
Directors have become extremely concerned about incurring personal
liability after the Enron and Worldcom debacles. The National Union
case raises an additional concern for officers and directors: to the extent
claims are made against them for failure of the company to make proper
environmental disclosure, the insurance designed to protect them from
personal liability may not cover such claims.1 47
IV. CITIZENS SUIT UNDER THE PIPELINE SAFETY ACT
In a rather intriguing case, several landowners in east Texas sued pipe-
line companies under the citizens suit provision of the Pipeline Safety
Act 148 alleging that they were injured as a result of alleged violations of
the Act and requesting that the district court appoint a special master to
take over the operations of the pipeline. 149 Issues of standing prevented
the court from considering some of the plaintiffs' claims. The court de-
clined to consider granting much of the relief requested.
150
The first issue under this suit and many, if not most, citizen suits is
standing under the Constitution. Under Article III, the U.S. Supreme
Court has ruled that standing requires some proof of injury.151 In apply-
ing this rule to the landowners' citizens suit, the district court concluded
that with respect to the pipeline crossing their land, a citizens suit would
not be dismissed based on a standing challenge alone. 152 The court would
not allow the citizens suit to continue with respect to land in the states of
Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, or Florida, or on other distant property
in Texas not owned by the plaintiffs, where the locations were remote to
the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs suffered no direct injury.' 53 The court
granted standing to the extent the plaintiffs demonstrated sufficient in-
jury to their property traceable to the defendants and which could be
redressed by the court. 154
The court also considered the relief sought in the pleadings. The plain-
tiffs argued the pipeline was old and had not been properly maintained,
in addition to a variety of other problems with the pipeline and its opera-
tion. Despite these allegations of mismanagement of the pipeline and the
145. Id. at *8 (quoting Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tex. Sec. Concepts & Investigation, 173
F.3d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1999).
146. Id. at *17.
147. See id.
148. Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60101-60133 (1996).
149. Wyble v. Gulf S. Pipeline Co., 308 F. Supp. 2d 733 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
150. Id. at 754.
151. Id. at 744-45 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997)).
152. Id. at 750.
153. Id. at 754.
154. Id. at 753-54.
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dangers that existed as a result, the court ruled that it would not appoint a
special master to "run the business of the pipeline," but rather that these
broader regulatory issues were better left to the legislative branch and the
regulatory agency with jurisdiction over the industry. 155
V. CRIMINAL CASES
The state courts considered appeals from a variety of criminal convic-
tions that were challenged on various grounds and produced interesting
opinions touching issues such as double jeopardy, passive disposal, and
the scope of "water in the state." Many of the opinions also addressed
the legal and factual sufficiency of convictions.
A. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The issue of double jeopardy arose in Romero v. State.156 In this case,
the City of El Paso issued a notice of violation to Ms. Romero for illegally
storing construction debris on her property on January 14, 2000. Ms. Ro-
mero was later charged with and convicted in municipal court of zoning
and debris violations that allegedly occurred on February 19, 2000. Dur-
ing the same time frame, the Texas Commission on Environmental Qual-
ity ("TCEQ") had been conducting their own investigation. Ms. Romero
was eventually charged with and convicted of violating the Texas Health
and Safety Code based on disposal of litter or solid waste that allegedly
occurred on or about November 27, 2000. Ms. Romero challenged the
state conviction, arguing that it was not legally or factually sufficient and
that it constituted double jeopardy because she had already been con-
victed in municipal court. 157
Ms. Romero argued that the state conviction was not legally or factu-
ally sufficient because "there was no testimony from anyone who actually
saw her dumping the waste. ' 158 The court noted that the State did not
have to show that Ms. Romero actually placed the waste on her property,
only that she was reckless in allowing the waste to be placed there.159
The court pointed out that Ms. Romero had a business relationship with
the person actually dumping the waste, that she knew by January of 2000
that there was illegal dumping at the site, that she visited the property in
March of 2000 and knew the illegal dumping was continuing, and that she
was able to clean up her property after she was charged with the state
violations.160 The court reasoned that this evidence indicated that "the
proof of guilt is not so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the
155. Id. at 754.
156. 129 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet. h.).
157. Id. at 264-65.
158. Id. at 266.
159. Id. at 265. Although illegal dumping is a strict liability crime in Texas as of Sep-
tember 1, 2001, because the complaint was filed in 2001 and the alleged actions occurred in
November of 2000, the court used the previous code provisions that required proof of a
reckless mental state. Id.
160. Id. at 266.
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jury's determination, nor was it manifestly unjust" and thus the evidence
was both legally and factually sufficient.161
The court also rejected Ms. Romero's argument that her conviction for
the state offense following her municipal court conviction constituted
double jeopardy. 162 The court applied the test set forth by the United
State Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States,163 namely whether
each of the penal provisions requires proof of a fact that the other does
not.164 The court pointed out that the municipal violation required proof
that the disposal created a public nuisance, while the state violation re-
quired proof that that the disposal took place at a site that is not an ap-
proved waste site and proof of disposal of more than a threshold amount
of waste.' 65 The court thus held that there were no double jeopardy con-
cerns and affirmed Ms. Romero's conviction. 166
Unlike the defendant in Romero, the Defendants in Ex Parte
Canady167 relied on a specific statutory prohibition against double jeop-
ardy found in the Water Code. And, unlike the defendant in Romero, the
defendants in Ex Parte Canady sought and received relief via habeas
corpus at the trial court level. In Canady, pursuant to agreed orders, the
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission ("TNRCC") (now
known as the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality) assessed ad-
ministrative penalties against two corporations for violations of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, the Health and Safety Code, and the Water Code.
After the penalties were paid, the four appellees were indicted in their
individual capacities for the same acts for which the administrative penal-
ties were paid. The appellees were employed by one of the corporations
at the time of the alleged violations. The appellees sought habeas relief
from the trial court from prosecution based on a provision in the Texas
Water Code that prohibits the State from pursuing additional civil or
criminal penalties for a violation for which an administrative penalty has
been paid. The trial court granted relief and the state appealed. 168
The court held that the payment of the administrative penalty by the
corporations prevented further prosecution against only the corpora-
tions. 169 The court quoted the language of section 7.162 of the Water
161. Id.
162. Id. at 267.
163. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
164. Romero, 129 S.W.3d at 266.
165. Id. at 266-67. The court also pointed out that the state and municipal violations
alleged different dates, although the court did not clearly indicate the relevance of the
different dates. Id. If the court meant that different acts on the different dates gave rise to
the separate violations, then double jeopardy is not implicated. Id. On the other hand, if
the state and municipal violations are based on the same act or omission, the mere fact that
different dates were alleged does not show that the state and municipal violations contain
independent elements. Id.
166. Id. at 267.
167. Ex Parte Canady, 140 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.
h.).
168. Id. at 847-48.
169. Id. at 849.
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Code and reasoned that "when two persons act in concert to commit an
offense under 7.162, each person commits a single violation, resulting in
two violations. '170 The court noted that "[t]he State alleged six people
violated section 7.162 .... When six people are involved in an act prohib-
ited by the statute, six separate violations have occurred, even though
each one stems from the same act.' 7 1 The court also found an analogous
interpretation of the Penal Code: "a corporation and its employees may
each be criminally responsible for the same acts which constitute a viola-
tion of the law.' 7 2 The court also examined the legislative history of the
Water Code and found support in it for its proposition. 73 The court
noted that the corporations each were assessed and paid administrative
penalties for their violations and thus the State was barred from further
prosecution of the corporations. 174 The court held that the appellees,
however, committed separate violations for which no administrative pen-
alty had been paid, and thus the State was not barred from prosecuting
those violations. 175 The court reversed the trial court's grant of habeas
relief and remanded the case.176
B. PASSIVE DISPOSAL
The Fourteenth District Court in Houston took the opportunity to rein-
force a recent case from the First District Court in Houston regarding
passive disposal in the criminal context in Slott v. State.177 In Slott, the
defendant challenged criminal convictions under the Water Code for
knowingly or intentionally storing and disposing of hazardous waste.
One of the challenges was to a conviction for disposing contaminated
sand in June 1998. Because the indictment was presented on July 20, 2001
and because the statute of limitations for the offense is three years, the
court required proof of disposal on or after July 20, 1998 and before July
20, 2001. Although the defendant disposed of the sand in June, the State
argued that because the sand continued to leak hazardous compounds
into the soil after initial disposal, the defendant continued to dispose of
the waste by allowing it to passively migrate into the soil.
178
The court rejected the State's argument, however, following the rea-
170. Id. (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.162 (Vernon 2000)).
171. Id. It is unclear from the court's opinion whether the TNRCC alleged all six viola-
tions from the outset, and if so, why they were not addressed in the original agreed order,
and if not, why the State chose not to pursue the allegations against the individuals from
the outset.
172. Id. at 850 (citing TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.23(a) (Vernon 2003)).
173. Id. at 850-51. The legislative history cited by the court is not particularly persua-
sive because (1) as the court points out, the legislative history does not address the provi-
sion in question, and (2) the legislative history indicates that separate acts by different
persons give rise to separate violations and does not indicate that a single act or acts will
give rise to multiple violations. See id.
174. Id. at 851.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 148 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2004, no pet. h.).
178. Id. at 626-27.
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soning in L.B. Foster Co. v. State.179 Although the State argued that the
court in L.B. Foster failed to consider certain RCRA cases discussing the
term "disposal," the court in this case distinguished those cases because
they involved the civil liability of polluters and did not involve the appli-
cation of a statute of limitations in a criminal context. 180 The court con-
cluded that, for criminal prosecutions under the Water Code, "the term
'disposal' does not include the passive disposal of hazardous wastes. In-
stead, some form of affirmative human conduct must accompany a dispo-
sal for it to rise to the level of criminal culpability. 1' 81
The court was also presented with a challenge to the trial court's jury
instruction. 182 The trial court instructed the jury that it was not required
to show that the defendants knew the waste was a hazardous waste, but
only that the defendants knew the material was waste and had the poten-
tial to be harmful to others or the environment.183 The defendants
claimed that this effectively created a strict liability statute for the dispo-
sal of waste by removing the culpable mental state. The court disagreed,
noting the traditional distinction between knowledge of the facts and
knowledge of the law. 184 The court concluded that it was not necessary
for the State to demonstrate that the defendants knew their waste was
hazardous as defined in the state regulations, but only that the waste was
hazardous in the sense that the waste had the potential to harm others or
the environment. 185 The court thus held that the jury instruction was
proper.186
C. SCOPE OF THE DEFINITION OF "WATER IN THE STATE"
In an interesting case involving the propriety of the trial judge's com-
ment to a jury, the court in Watts v. State,187 examined the scope of the
term "water in the State." The court overturned a criminal conviction
under the Water Code for discharge into a "water in the state" because of
the potential harm caused by the trial court's instruction to the jury that a
"drainage ditch was one of the types of surface water the legislature
sought to protect under the Water Code Act."'1 88 There was a difference
in opinion among the Justices on the Panel regarding why the statement
was harmful.189 Two of the three Justices concluded that the instruction
was a correct statement of law and that the harm arose because, "without
the benefit of the trial court's instruction, it is conceivable appellant's
179. See id. at 628 (discussing L.B. Foster Co. v. State, 106 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd)).
180. Id. at 629.
181. Id. (citing L.B. Foster, 106 S.W.3d at 207).
182. Id. at 632.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 633.
186. Id.
187. 140 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2004, pet. ref'd).
188. Id. at 862; see also TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.145 (Vernon 2000).
189. Watts, 140 S.W.3d at 867.
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counsel might have induced the jury to believe otherwise." 190 On the
other hand, Justice Frost concluded that the trial court's instruction was
not necessarily correct and the harm was that the "[a]ppellant had a right
to a jury verdict based on the jury's determination of the meaning of the
undefined statutory terms [in the definition of water in the state], in ac-
cordance with common parlance and understanding."'191 This case is of
interest because of the competing constructions of "water in the state."
The majority concluded that a drainage ditch is water in the state based
primarily on the broad definition of "water in the state.' 192 The majority
pointed out that the beds and banks of all watercourses are included in
the definition of water in the state, even if the watercourse contains water
only intermittently. 193 Justice Frost, on the other hand, pointed out that
while "many ditches may fall within the definition of water in the state,
all ditches do not, as a matter of law, constitute water in the state.'
94
Beds and banks of watercourses and bodies of water qualify, but this pre-
supposes that there is some water present, even if only intermittently.
195
Dry ditches that do not qualify as watercourses or bodies of water thus do
not qualify as waters in the state.1 96 And while the Texas Legislature did
not include the term "ditch" in the definition of "water in the state," the
Legislature used the term "ditch" in other sections of the Water Code.
197
Furthermore, the Legislature used the terms "ditch" and "watercourse"
separately in some of those other sections, implying that the a ditch is not
necessarily always a watercourse. 198 The term "ditch" is also included as
an example in the Water Code's definition of "point source" and there
are prohibitions on discharging wastes from point sources into any water
in the state.19 9 These provisions do not support the notion that a point
source is itself necessarily water in the state.2 00 Justice Frost stated that
"it is logical to conclude that all ditches do not necessarily fall under this
definition [of water in the state], only those that otherwise come within
the language of the definition."1
°2 0
One reason for the difference in opinion is the difference in the use of
terms. The majority queries whether a drainage ditch is a water in the
state.2 02 On the other hand, Justice Frost is answering whether a ditch,
drainage or otherwise, is categorically a water in the state. 20 3 The opin-
190. Id. at 868.
191. Id. at 870 (Frost, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 866-67.
193. Id. at 866.
194. Id. at 868 (Frost, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id. at 868-69 (Frost, J., concurring).
196. See id. at 870 (Frost, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 869 (Frost, J., concurring) (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.001(8)(E)
(Vernon 2000)).
198. Id. (Frost, J., concurring).
199. Id. (Frost, J., concurring).
200. Id. (Frost, J., concurring).
201. Id. (Frost, J., concurring).
202. See generally id. at 865.
203. See id. at 870 (Frost, J., concurring).
[Vol. 58
Environmental Law
ions can be reconciled if one assumes that a drainage ditch necessarily
contains surface water or is a watercourse. The question then becomes
whether a specific ditch is a "drainage ditch" or not. Considered in this
light, the trial judge's comment may have had the potential to lead the
jury to believe that the specific ditch it was considering was conclusively a
drainage ditch and accordingly a water of the state.204
D. MISCELLANEOUS CASES INVOLVING VIOLATIONS OF THE
WATER CODE
1. Proof of Disposal of Used Oil
Although the case was decided on procedural grounds, the court pro-
vided clear indications of its thoughts on the appellant's substantive argu-
ments in Alli v. State.20 5 Defendant Alli raised a number of arguments in
challenging his conviction for disposing of used oil on land. First, Alli
argued that his convictions were legally and factually insufficient. The
court, however, was not provided with any of the exhibits admitted at
trial. The court requested a supplemental record but did not receive one.
Because the appellant failed to present a complete record for review, the
court held that he waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence.20 6 Nonetheless, the court indicated in a footnote that an argument
similar to the defendant's argument, namely that the evidence failed to
establish that he "directly disposed" of used oil, was rejected by the First
District Court of Appeals. 20 7
The defendant also argued that the indictment was jurisdictionally de-
fective in that a corporation could not be criminally liable for the Water
Code provision under which defendant was convicted. The court held
that defendant waived any defect in the indictment because there was no
indication that the objection was raised prior to trial.20 8 But the court
pointed out, again in a footnote, that this argument too had been rejected
by the First District Court of Appeals in another case.20 9
2. Failure to Render Continuous and Adequate Water Service
In a case regarding the provision of a safe water supply, the meaning of
"adequate" and how the State may demonstrate that water is not "ade-
quate" were both considered by the court. 210 The operator of a retail
public utility appealed his conviction under the Water Code for willfully
and knowingly failing to render continuous and adequate water service
on or about March 19, 1997. TNRCC testing of the defendant's water
204. See id.
205. Alli v. State, No. 11-02-00030-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3242 (Tex. App.-East-
land Apr. 8, 2004, pet. ref'd)
206. Id. at *34.
207. Id. at *3 n.2 (citing L.B. Foster Co. v. State, 106 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd)).
208. Id. at *5.
209. Id. (citing L.B. Foster, 106 S.W.3d at 194).
210. McClevey v. State, 143 S.W.3d 522, 532 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet. h.).
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wells in 1996 and 1997 indicated benzene in excess of the Maximum Con-
taminant Level ("MCL") established by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency under the Safe Drinking Water Act2 1 ' in one of the wells.
The issues in the case were twofold: what amount of monitoring was suffi-
cient to allege a violation and what was considered safe under the rele-
vant statute.2
12
McClevey first argued that the evidence was legally insufficient be-
cause the State did not have quarterly monitoring reports indicating ben-
zene in excess of the MCL. The court pointed out that the purpose of the
quarterly monitoring was to determine the necessary monitoring fre-
quency, not to exempt persons from criminal prosecution.2 13 Further-
more, "[t]he State is not required to wait a year until the completion of
quarterly monitoring before taking administrative action to protect public
drinking water or to seek criminal prosecution .... "214 The court also
noted that there were tests showing that well water contained benzene in
excess of the MCL before, during, and after the quarterly monitoring pe-
riod for the date alleged by the State.215 The court thus rejected defen-
dant's legal sufficiency challenge.2 16
The second challenge was more fundamental: the defendant claimed
that the evidence was factually insufficient to support his conviction be-
cause the evidence failed to demonstrate that the water was not "ade-
quate," meaning it was not "safe. ' 217 The court rejected the defendant's
argument for two reasons.2 18 First, the court rejected the argument be-
cause the case was tried on a different theory. 219 Second, the court held
that the evidence supporting the verdict was not too weak to support the
finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; while the defendant
presented opinion testimony that the water was safe despite exceeding
the MCLs, the prosecution presented its own opinion testimony and there
was testimony by the defendant's employees that they would not want to
drink or provide their children water with benzene in it.220 The court
thus held that the evidence supporting the conviction, both on its own
and balanced against the contrary evidence, was factually sufficient.221
211. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 13.250(a) (Vernon 2000).
212. McClevey, 143 S.W.3d at 533-34.




217. Id. at 534-35.
218. See id. at 536-37.





VI. AIR EMISSIONS CASES
A. AGENCY AUTHORITY RELATED TO CONTROL MEASURES IN THE
HOUSTON-GALVESTON NONATTAINMENT AREA
1. Statutory Authority
In Brazoria County v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality,
Brazoria County raised statutory authority and Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA") 22 2 challenges to measures adopted by the Texas Transporta-
tion Commission and the TCEQ as part of the state's implementation
plan ("SIP") to attain the federal-national ambient-air-quality standards
("NAAQS") in the eight-county Houston-Galveston Area ("HGA"). 223
EPA classifies the HGA, which includes Brazoria County, as a severe
nonattainment area with respect to the one-hour standard for ozone.22 4
The TCEQ's SIP mandated the adoption of environmental speed limits
not to exceed 55 miles per hour within all eight counties of the HGA.225
Brazoria County first challenged the statutory authority granted to the
Transportation Commission under section 545.353 of the Transportation
Code22 6 to adopt environmental speed limits. When the Transportation
Commission adopted the environmental speed limits, its authorizing stat-
ute empowered the commission to declare a prima facie "reasonable and
safe" speed limit for any part of a highway system. In 1995, the Legisla-
ture granted the Transportation Commission authority to alter the prima
facie speed limit if engineering and traffic studies indicate that the speed
limit is unreasonable or unsafe and directed the Commission to consider
road conditions and "other circumstances" related to the "safety of the
motoring public. ' 227 The Transportation Commission thereafter adopted
rules establishing procedures for adopting "regulatory" speed zones and
"environmental" speed zones and, in 2000, issued minute orders estab-
lishing environmental speed limits in the HGA not to exceed 55 miles per
hour.2 28 In 2003, the Legislature amended the Transportation Code to
prohibit the Commission from declaring a prima facie speed limit for en-
vironmental purposes, but provided that the restriction did not affect
speed limits approved before the effective date of the act.229 The Austin
Court of Appeals held that this limitation served as ratification of the
Transportation Commission's existing environmental speed limits. 230
222. Administrative Procedure Act, TEX. GovT. CODE ANN. § 2001.001-.902 (Vernon
2000).
223. Brazoria County v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 128 S.W.3d 728, 734 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2004, no pet. h.).
224. Id. at 733.
225. Id.
226. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.353 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
227. Brazoria County, 128 S.W.3d at 736 (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 545.353(b), (e) (Vernon 1996)).
228. Id.
229. Id; see also TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.3530) (Vernon 1996); Act of June 2,
2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1331, § 27(c), 2003 Tex. Gen Laws 5993, 6000.
230. Brazoria County, 128 S.W.3d at 736.
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The court rejected the County's challenge that the Transportation
Commission impermissibly considered the potential for federal funding
cuts in adopting the environmental speed limits, concluding that that the
Transportation Commission's concerns over public health fell within its
statutory authority to protect the safety of the motoring public.231 The
court also rejected the County's challenge that the Transportation Com-
mission had impermissibly delegated its speed limit-setting authority to
the TCEQ on the grounds that, although the TCEQ served in an advisory
capacity, the Commission retained final authority to adopt or reject the
TCEQ's recommendations. 232 The County also claimed the Transporta-
tion Commission's minute orders adopting the environmental speed lim-
its were "rules" subject to the rulemaking procedures of the APA.233 The
court rejected this challenge on the grounds that the Transportation Code
expressly authorized the Transportation Commission to alter prima facie
speed limits by order recorded in the minutes. 234
Brazoria County challenged the statutory authority of the TCEQ's en-
hanced vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Rules ("I/M rules") on the
grounds that, when adopted, the statute authorized I/M rules for specified
counties only, not including Brazoria County. 235 The court rejected this
challenge, finding that, at the time, two statutes granted TCEQ authority,
and although one mandated adoption of I/M rules in certain counties, the
other granted the TCEQ discretion to act in other areas, such as Brazoria
County, consistent with federal law.236
2. Reasoned Justification
Brazoria County also raised an APA challenge to the I/M rules on the
grounds that TCEQ failed to provide a reasoned justification for requir-
ing I/M in Brazoria County in 2003 when the statutory date to attain the
NAAQS was not until 2007 and for the absence of an opt-out provision
for Brazoria Country that was available to three rural counties in the
HGA.237 With respect to the 2003 phase-in date, the court found TCEQ
provided a reasoned justification for beginning the phase-in with areas
with the most emissions and providing sufficient time to revise its models
to ensure the area would timely achieve attainment.238 The court re-
jected Brazoria County's claim of no reasoned justification to deny Bra-
zoria County an opt-out clause on the grounds that elected officials from
the three counties that were granted the opt-out clause had requested it
and that the I/M program in those counties could contribute only a "tiny"
231. Id. at 737.
232. Id.
233. Id. (discussing TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.003(6) (Vernon 2000)).
234. Id. (discussing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.353(a) (Vernon 1996)).
235. Id. at 739.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 740-41.
238. Id. at 741.
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fraction of the reductions needed to attain the NAAQS. 239
3. Regulatory Impact Analysis
One of the more interesting aspects of the Brazoria County case is the
court's analysis of the County's claim that TCEQ failed to conduct a reg-
ulatory impact analysis of the I/M rules as required by the APA. Under
Section 2001.0225(a)(1) of the APA, state agencies must conduct a regu-
latory impact analysis of major environmental rules if the outcome of the
rule will "exceed a standard set by federal law, unless the rule is specifi-
cally required by state law."' 240 Brazoria County claimed because the
TCEQ I/M rules covered more vehicles than is required in federal I/M
rules and are more stringent that the federal I/M rules, the TCEQ is re-
quired to prepare a regulatory impact analysis of the rules. "The court
rejected this argument, finding that the I/M rules are not 'standards' but
are instead 'methods and control strategies' chosen by the State to
achieve, not exceed, the federal National Ambient Air Quality
Standards.'"241
B. ALLOCATION OF NITROGEN OXIDE EMISSION CREDITS
To OPERATOR
In Phillips Petroleum Company v. TCEQ,242 the owner of boilers at a
refinery challenged TCEQ's allocation of nitrogen oxide emission credits
for the boilers to a co-located cogeneration plant that operated the boil-
ers. The appeal followed Phillips' unsuccessful appeal to the district
court. In December 2000, TCEQ created the Mass Emission Cap and
Trade Program (MECT) to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions in the HGA.
Under the MECT, TCEQ would allocate nitrogen oxide allowances to
existing facilities based upon their emissions from 1997 through 1999.
Phillips owned eight boilers that were located within the boundaries of its
refinery. Sweeny Cogeneration LP ("Sweeny") operated the boilers as
part of its cogeneration plant that was also located within the boundaries
of the refinery. Both Phillips and Sweeny applied to TCEQ for the
allowances. 2
43
TCEQ allocated the allowances to Sweeny, relying on the 1995 permit-
ting action authorizing construction of the cogeneration units. In that ac-
tion, Sweeny avoided nonattainment new source review for the
cogeneration units by offsetting the new emissions from those units with
239. Id.
240. Id.; see also TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.0225(a)(1) (Vernon 2000).
241. Brazoria County, 128 S.W.3d at 742. The court also rejected the County's claim
that TCEQ failed to conduct a regulatory impact analysis of its lawn-maintenance rules on
the same basis. Id. at 743-44. The court rejected the County's claim against TCEQ's fiscal
note on the lawn-maintenance rule APA section 2001.024(a)(4)(C), finding the note esti-
mated the costs to state and local governments and does not affect state and local reve-
nues. Id. at 742-43.
242. 121 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet. h.).
243. Id. at 504.
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emission reductions from the eight existing boilers at the Phillips refinery.
Initially, TCEQ found Sweeney's application deficient as to Sweeney's
"ultimate operational control" over the boilers. But TCEQ issued the
permit after Phillips represented that it "has no authority independent of
the Partnership's authority under the permit to cause emissions from the
boilers. '244 The permit TCEQ issued to Sweeney included authorization
to operate the boilers.245
Phillips challenged TCEQ's grant of allowances to Sweeney, claiming
that the agency should take into account its ownership of the boilers. In
its award of the allowances from the boilers to Sweeney, TCEQ relied on
the longstanding definition of "source" in the Clean Air Act, which re-
quires that a building, structure, facility or installation that emits or may
emit any regulated air pollutant source be under the control of the same
person or persons or under common control to be part of the same
source. Phillips claimed TCEQ erred in considering "operational con-
trol" and policy concerns, neither of which are required in the MECT
rules.246 Phillips urged the court to take into account its ownership and
ability to "flip the switches" of the boilers and to ignore the assurances it
provided in 1995 for nonattainment new source review netting
purposes. 24
7
The court affirmed the judgment of the district court that upheld
TCEQ's award of allowances to Sweeney.248 In doing so, the court relied
on the history of the definition of "source" and its use in both the MECT
and nonattainment new-source review regulations. The court also noted
that the record reflected the boilers were part of Sweeney's source under
the nonattainment new-source review permit. 249
244. Id. at 505.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 508.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 509.
249. Id.
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